There hasn't really been a good philosophy/politics thread on
this board in a while, so I thought I would at least try to start
one.
I've recently been reading Kropotkin's Ethics, which is an
excellent book, if you're interested. Anyways, the conclusion that
Kropotkin reaches, I think, is that morality, even the definition
of ethical behavior, is based not in pure reason, but rather an
ingrained sense of ethics within humanity (due to evolution). This
is not a thesis I agreed with at the start of the book, but I must
admit it is one I am coming to realize as correct upon finishing
the book.
Before reading I had realized at least that most people's actions
was shaped by evolution (memetic or genetic) but though ultimately
the true morality of their actions could be determined using pure
reason/induction/etc. without invoking highly uprovable moral
assertions. I'm no longer so sure of this, though the notion seems,
in some sense, repugnant to me, as I can't see how to establish a
positive basis for morality that would, say, rule slavery as
immoral. It of course clearly seems so to me, but it was not so
clear to the greeks (unless they were a slave themselves).
Should we just accept empathy as the fundamental basis of morality,
then, or utilitarian theory? (really one in the same, the way I see
it)
As it is, I'm very tired, and I'm sure my writing reflects this. I
will post more tomorrow, but in the meantime, any thoughts
regarding this general topic? Any other Kropotkin fans?
Brad
My friend and I were having a very similar discussion yesterday
(it was the day our prime-minister was shot 7 years ago), we
realized that first before talking about ethics you must first
define exactly what you mean by ethics, because there is a huge
difference between religon ethics (word of god) or democratic
ethics. Because killing Yitzhak Rabin (the prime minister) could
have seemed completely logical and ethical by religon ethics to
some rabbais (because of is actions). The bible itself tells that
god ordered the genocide of the Amaleks.
My friends told me that he read a book on the philosophy of Cant
(or Kant) and he says that a moral thing is something that you
would agree that will be a law (don't think I phrased this well).
For example, if you murder someone then the act is moral if you
agree that a law will come out that says that everybody could
murder.
It is a very interesting definition, but it has one flaw it
completely erases private cases. For instance, your boy is very
sick and you steal a kind of drug that would save his life, by
kant's definition what you did is NOT MORAL.
Yatir
No time to say much now (but expect more later), but I will say a quick word about Kant. Kant's Categorical Imperative that Yatir referred to above is basically an adaptation of the principle of "do unto others as you would have them do unto you". Yatir, you've slightly misinterpreted the principle: it says that you should only do something if you would want the maxim of that action to become universal. So, for example in your case of stealing the drugs, probably many people would want the maxim of that action to become universal (i.e. that saving lives is more important than respecting property rights).
Brad you say that the book you read states that morals and ethics are a product of evolution,why then do so many different and successfully functioning societies have such different moral codes? Is any moral code more 'correct' or 'universal' than any other? Or is a moral code in fact a fabrication by a particular society, ie in some societies for example cannibalism is morally correct, is this universally wrong and unjust? Can anybody truly offer an objective viewpoint on this matter, having been born into and shaped by a particular society themselves? What about animals, they seem to have different morals to us yet they have their own successfully functioning societies. Does the act of being self aware and able to think about such matters make us more morally responsible for our actions than animals? Can a cat be held morally responsible for murdering a mouse or is it just part of its 'nature'? Do humans have a 'nature' and do the moral codes in modern day society act for or against this 'nature'? Discuss!!
I hope Mr.Kropotkin in his book concludes in this fashion "I
think moral is an evolution of ......" rather than "Moral is
nothing but an evolution of.....".I mean to say,he concludes the
idea as "his" viewpoint rather than a general truth.
However the ideas of a particular individual does depend upon how
the individual views himself in the frame called society.The
society thus plays a significant role in modelling one's views on
morality.So one might say that everyone in general is quite in
agreement with Mr.Kropotkin.
My only concern on the book lies on the fact - whether Mr.Kropotkin
has emphasized more on the society or the individual????I have read
a book written by "Premchand" one of the noted writers in Indian
literature.The book is basically a collection of stories and these
stories deal with pre-indian independence times.All these stories
have very much the same theme "human moral and ethical values
shattered under the grinding stones of slavery".However,you won't
believe it, even though the all the stories had the same theme ..
these stories had very different and interesting outcomes.These
outcomes were generally based upon the individual's frame of
mind.....
At this point or juncture,i would also like to make a special
mention of the film "CAST AWAY"....
Think of tom hanks .. who is left alone in a island..For him,moral
and ethical values hold no interest as he lost himself in the crowd
of silence and is rendered speechless....The picture takes everyone
through waves of different human emotions and at every point
humanity is kept in perspective.....(A very beautiful picture
indeed)
love arun
I'll start from the base. My basic problem arises from the fact
that there is no correlation between what is defined as "moral" and
what one should do. Indeed, even the word "should" is loaded
in this context, and seems the phrase "one should" seems hopelessly
ambiguous and without definition.
But, suppose a given set of actions is defined as "morality."
Before we could convince others (or ourselves) that they should act
"moral" (in the sense of the word used above) we would need to show
the logical connection between this set of actions and something
defined as what one "should" do. I haven't the foggiest idea what
this thing one "should" do is though, and I can't see a way to not
go in circles at this point. It doesn't seem as though a positive
basis for ethics or morality could be established. Indeed, often
the "should" assumption is implicit in any sort of system of
ethics, but the same logic will apply.
Having this, how could one rule out say, slavery or cannibalism,
without appealing to some sort of prejudices? And surely these
prejudices aren't universal, as perhaps some sort of notion of
cause and effect is, simply because, as Andrew points out,
conceptions of what 'should' be done has varied tremendously
between various civilizations.
However, scientific conceptions have also varied tremendously from
age to age, and this certainly shouldn't prevent us from assuming
that there is a definite observable universe (though it may cast
doubts). My guess (and only a guess) is that such things as
cannibalism and slavery were not truly justified from a moral
viewpoint, but rather merely 'done.' I know a good deal of people
who currently act not according to any moral conceptions, but
rather have just become socialized to a given state of being. It
seems this is possible, just as it is possible for people to
believe spectacularly untrue things because of a threat of
punishment or because everyone else believes a particular
thing.
Andrew, you mention two things of interest. First, animal "ethics."
To the extent that animals have been observed, some general
similarities between their conduct and our conduct have been
observed, and they do practice various forms of mutual aid,
probably without the underlying reasoning humans tend to use when
justifying their behavior.
Second, the survival of societies that practice immoral things, at
least so far as I or you can tell. To say that this influences
evolution, however, neglects the fact that evolution occurs over a
very long time, and it would seem that a conception of ethics in
mankind was carved out in the neolithic age or earlier, probably
much earlier. So, I don't think the survival of such societies
implies anything more than the survival of, say, the church, which
has promoted and continues to promote blatantly false
doctrines.
You also write that ethnocentrism is likely to influence any
discussion on morality. This is probably true, but I don't see what
it really adds to the discussion - unless you can show that a
particular comment by a person is ethnocentric, I don't think their
comment should be automatically swept aside. Reality is reality,
however much that reality may be influenced by a particular social
meme. This is probably taking your comment farther than it was
intended, though, and if so, I apologise.
Brad
I don't see ethics as something that undergoes evolution but
rather as something that changes in time, and in different
cultures. I think everyone to himself can decide what is for him
considered to me moral. This "moral machine" formalizes in
everyone, I think, at the first 15-18 years of his life and
influenced by society, by personal expriences, by norms and by
family. So it is enough to plant a seed in a child that tells him
something like cannibalizm is OK for it to slowly infeltrate our
society. The child himself might not see this kind of thing as
moral, but he would have less harsh feelings about this kind of
acts, and probably after some generations cannibalizm could turn to
be a norm.
I read somewhere that while the europeans were discusted by the
cannibalizm of the native americans, cannibalizm was wide spread in
europe itself. These acts were dressed up in clothes of cures and
medicine (parts of decised people, mummies etc..).
Have any of you read the book "Lord of the flies" it shows very
remarkably how society behaves the same even in a remote island
with only children.
Yatir
I've read Lord of the Flies, and enjoyed it, but it's far from
scientific. I suppose some system of roughly tribal organization is
inevitable in any "undevoloped" society, though (and to some extent
certain aspects of tribes are still very much preserved in the
modern world - this in itself is very suggestive about human
nature).
However, when I talk of morality, I should distinguish this from
the way in which humans actually act. The way a human A reacts in
situation X is, to me, behavior, not morals. Similarly, the way a
human A thinks he should react in situation X is not morality; it
is beliefs, which could, and often do, coincide with
morality/ethics. Morality is the way human A "should" act in
situation X - by definition it is universal. Again, it seems to me
that considerations here are guided by meeting human needs and
wants. In this sense, I think that cannabilism, while an
established habit, was not moral.
Brad
I can you be sure that there is a thing called "unviersal
morality"?
I see it as a definition made by man.
It is like saying that thre is a universal fashion, that there is
an ideal how everyone should change and it changes from time to
time like morality. I see it as absurd.
Yatir
So do the people in which cannibalism occurs not consider how they are behaving? They must surely think that what they are doing is moral otherwise they'd be an inherently evil society. Or they may not consider moral issues at all, in which case could they be classed as human? It could be that they have just grown up with the habit establshed within their society but that habit must have begun sometime and so the group which started it must have been evil or not human in the true sense of the word. Unless we adopt the moral relativist viewpoint that is.
I don't agree andrew, what if cannibalism is the nature to
humans and some group came up and said: "No, we don't agree". Just
like most of the world eats meat, and the rest are vegeterians and
are opposed to it.
Yatir
I think the situation with cannibalism is analogous to the one
with "meat-eating." I currently am a vegetarian but was not always
so, and the time I wasn't I really didn't consider the morality of
eating meat. I don't think people necessarily consider the morality
of their actions - I certainly don't always - and this may lead to
immoral behavior, but not necessarily immoral conceptions of how
one should act. (This is to say nothing of why I believe
vegetarianism more moral...)
You counter this by writing, "that habit must have begun sometime
and so the group which started it must have been evil or not human
in the true sense of the word," implicitly assuming that the group
that started it had some form of rational justification for it. I
very much doubt there was such a justification, just as I doubt the
"decision" for humans and other animals to form a society was in
any way motivated by rational discourse (although, in the latter
case, it very well can be justified rationally). Why should we
assume that these things (cannibalism, social organization, etc.)
occured after man had developed the rational capabilities to
consider them, or the linguistic capabilities to cause others to
consider them?
The closest I can come, currently, to writing anything concise
about my opinions on morality: There are certain moral conceptions
ingrained within all humans, similar to the way induction is within
all humans. This does not mean that humans always use either of
these; they often do not. As to what these moral conceptions are, I
cannot be sure. They seem to arise from considerations of
collective welfare, at least within myself.
Brad
So what you are saying is that there could be a person with
perfect morality?
Yatir
Still no time to say much, but when you suggest cannibalism as an example of something that couldn't be moral, is it because of the eating, the killing, or the killing for the purpose of eating? Why? For example, if someone was dead or had been killed, wouldn't it be a waste of meat not to eat them? Perhaps if I didn't eat some dead guy I'd have to kill an animal to eat that instead, wouldn't that be worse?
I'd say the killing, personally. I'm not too sure where you're
going, but it seems immoral because they would probably prefer to
be alive. As to why I don't eat dead people then - I'm following
Spinozas advice of 'conforming where it does not inhibit ones
purpose.'
(something like that)
Brad
OK, I have some time now.
I don't think there is a universal morality in any meaningful
sense. Possibly, given a set of moral axioms you could specify
behaviour to be moral or not moral. There are two problems with
this. Firstly, nobody has to agree to those axioms. Secondly, it is
likely that it would be technically impossible in most real
situations to derive anything from the axioms. Utilitarianism
always had this problem; how do you evaluate individuals'
utilities? how do you aggregate these utilities? In general, you're
going to come up with the same sorts of problems you get when
trying to unambiguously frame a law, there has to be interpretation
and interpretation is subjective. The best you can achieve is some
degree of consensus.
Thinking about morality and ethics analytically is then not going
to get us to a set of rules or maxims that everyone can agree on,
but that doesn't mean it's useless. By thinking carefully about
morality we can decide what we think is right to do. One way to do
this is to internally propose a general rule and see what sorts of
conclusions it leads to. If we're satisfied with this rule we can
provisionally use it as a guide for own behaviour. (This may have
been what Kant was trying to get at with his categorical
imperative, but I haven't read enough to know.) The internal debate
can also be made into a public debate. Although we shouldn't expect
to reach a perfect consensus on issues of morality, debate can
still help us to understand and modify our own beliefs about
morality.
Personally, I find two principles to be particularly useful in
thinking about these things myself: (1) Kant's categorical
imperative described above, (2) the definition of liberty (which I
think comes from the French revolution) as freedom to act in any
way that doesn't infringe on anybody else's liberty.
When I said these people may not be 'human in the true sense of
the word' i meant that they were not capable of rational discussion
and justification of issues so I agree with your point Brad on
that, sorry for a being a little ambiguous!
I like your distinction between believing in a moral framework and
acting within a moral framework, people often act without thinking
and sometimes there instincts or desires counter what they believe
to be morally just. Out of interest how do you think a behaviourist
would view morals? Could he make the same distinction between
believing in a moral framework and acting in a moral framework?
I have read some books where authors beleive that ethical codes
have arisen by evolution through the interplay of biology and
culture. In a sense these authors are reviving the idea of moral
sentiments that was developed in the eighteenth century by the
British empiricists Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, and Adam
Smith.
What have been thought of as moral sentiments are now taken to mean
moral instincts (as defined by the modern behavioral sciences),
subject to judgment according to their consequences. Such
sentiments are thus derived from epigenetic rules -- hereditary
biases in mental development, usually conditioned by emotion, that
influence concepts and decisions made from them. The primary origin
of moral instincts is the dynamic relation between cooperation and
defection. The essential ingredient for the molding of the
instincts during genetic evolution in any species is intelligence
high enough to judge and manipulate the tension generated by the
dynamism. That level of intelligence allows the building of complex
mental scenarios well into the future. It occurs, so far as is
known, only in human beings and perhaps their closest relatives
among the higher apes.
A way of envisioning the hypothetical earliest stages of moral
evolution is provided by game theory, particularly the solutions to
the famous Prisoner's Dilemma. Consider the following typical
scenario of the dilemma. Two gang members have been arrested for
murder and are being questioned separately. The evidence against
them is strong but not irrefutable. The first gang member believes
that if he turns state's witness, he will be granted immunity and
his partner will be sentenced to life in prison. But he is also
aware that his partner has the same option, and that if both of
them exercise it, neither will be granted immunity. That is the
dilemma. Will the two gang members independently defect, so that
both take the hard fall? They will not, because they agreed in
advance to remain silent if caught. By doing so, both hope to be
convicted on a lesser charge or escape punishment altogether.
Criminal gangs have turned this principle of calculation into an
ethical precept: Never rat on another member; always be a stand-up
guy. Honor does exist among thieves. The gang is a society of
sorts; its code is the same as that of a captive soldier in
wartime, obliged to give only name, rank, and serial number.
In one form or another, comparable dilemmas that are solvable by
cooperation occur constantly and everywhere in daily life. The
payoff is variously money, status, power, sex, access, comfort, or
health. Most of these proximate rewards are converted into the
universal bottom line of Darwinian genetic fitness: greater
longevity and a secure, growing family.
And so it has most likely always been. Imagine a Paleolithic band
of five hunters. One considers breaking away from the others to
look for an antelope on his own. If successful, he will gain a
large quantity of meat and hide -- five times as much as if he
stays with the band and they are successful. But he knows from
experience that his chances of success are very low, much less than
the chances of the band of five working together. In addition,
whether successful alone or not, he will suffer animosity from the
others for lessening their prospects. By custom the band members
remain together and share equitably the animals they kill. So the
hunter stays. He also observes good manners in doing so, especially
if he is the one who makes the kill. Boastful pride is condemned,
because it rips the delicate web of reciprocity.
Now suppose that human propensities to cooperate or defect are
heritable: some people are innately more cooperative, others less
so. In this respect moral aptitude would simply be like almost all
other mental traits studied to date. Among traits with documented
heritability, those closest to moral aptitude are empathy with the
distress of others and certain processes of attachment between
infants and their caregivers. To the heritability of moral aptitude
add the abundant evidence of history that cooperative individuals
generally survive longer and leave more offspring. Following that
reasoning, in the course of evolutionary history genes predisposing
people toward cooperative behavior would have come to predominate
in the human population as a whole.
Such a process repeated through thousands of generations inevitably
gave rise to moral sentiments. With the exception of psychopaths
(if any truly exist), every person vividly experiences these
instincts variously as conscience, self-respect, remorse, empathy,
shame, humility, and moral outrage. They bias cultural evolution
toward the conventions that express the universal moral codes of
honor, patriotism, altruism, justice, compassion, mercy, and
redemption.
love arun
Arun, when you're quoting someone you should say so. In this case, a link to the article would be best: http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/98apr/biomoral.htm.
First of all, arun, I must say: "Well said and written" , you
can easily submit this as an essay somewhere.
Second, what you're saying (if I understand you correctly) is that
an act is considered moral if and only if it coincides with the
moral database of the group. Lets say there was a first vegeterian,
his ethics didn't coincide with the group so his decision to "not
eat animals" is considered immoral. He decides to stick with his
beliefs because of a certain genetic trait, that "orders" him not
to go along with the main-stream. After a while more people join
his "group of vegeterians" and they start to form a group as well
and they keep on growing until the major group is forced to accept
their vegeterianism as moral and thus accept the notion that it is
ok for some people to eat meat and for others not to eat meat, to
accept the fact that there is no contradiction.
We are left to conclude that these minority people that have in
them the genetic trait of going against the system are the creators
of moral standards.
Maybe if Arun's hunter had chosen to leave his group maybe he would
have started a snowball that would have resulted in us believing
that it is a "moral" act to hunt seperatly. [To abandon your
friends for private reward (food)]
Yatir
And I thought you wrote it!
(I wrote my post before Dan's)
Yatir
Hi. I think this discussion is "diverging" into a debate between
ethical relativism and absolutism; indeed, there were strains of
this debate in my original message. In any case, I have much to say
on this topic, but before I say these things, I should reccomend
the essay by W.T. Stace entitled (at least in the book I read it
from) "Is There a Universal Standard for Ethics?" [it was taken
from the book "The Concept of Morals"]
I am, at least to the extent that I am currently persuaded to be, a
moral absolutist. The primary objection to this is, namely, the one
Dan made:
"nobody has to agree to those axioms." That is, there has been a
great variation among moral ideas in the past, and different
tribes, societies, and even different people within the same
society, have concieved of different "axioms" for morality.
This is without a doubt true. But people have done the same for
interpretations of objective reality, or indeed the supposition of
induction itself (e.g. the Pyrrhonist sect). Does this imply that
there is no objective reality? No such concept as induction?
One could press on, however, stating that morality is ill defined,
and that there is no real starting point - something that, say,
objective reality definitely has. This is true, and to be honest, I
have no way to circumvent it. It just seems that humanity is
ingrained with so many common features that a definitive system of
morality is unavoidable, just as the way all humans use induction
is essential for survival. I cannot, of course, prove this, and I
see no point in trying to argue it. I wouldn't put much faith in
it, and I would reverse my opinion in a second if any concrete
evidence were used to support the other side.
It just seems that, if you ask a child (perhaps anyone) which is
better, something that causes greater happiness, or something that
causes less, he will say the greater. To me, morality consists in
this. We then only need to find what sorts of things meet
humanity's needs and provide contentment and happiness. Easier said
than done, I'll admit.
Brad
Dan,
i must say i had no idea of the site there.....Thanks for the
link...
We are having a Mock-GD test next week in our college so i was
going through some of the books in the library when i stumbled upon
a book called as "Discussions and Debates" which had a compilation
of good discussion papers and illustrations of live
debates....
One of these papers is incidentally the one in the
site.Amazing!...(Damn!! it would have been much easier for me to
cut and paste that thing or even just give the link rather than
type the whole thing out!!!
)
Anyways,i am sorry for all the trouble u people went through....i
should have mentioned that "the extract is from a book"..But the
topic was so interesting that i just typed it out so that everyone
has a look into this thing ... especially the paragraph i mentioned
is very captivating one ....
Hope no one holds any grudge against me
!!
love arun
(Continuing from the last to last post .. though this is not
from the book
)
If anyone has read the entire link that Dan gave or atleast has
gone through that message i posted before would realise that at the
end we are to left to visualize two examples there ... one is of
the gang members and the other is that if the hunters....
It was hard for me to actually gulp the idea down my throat since i
felt something missing there.....it drove me to make a pragmatic
search of such examples...
This is an incident that took place in train while i was coming
from college today...
A child (not more than 9 years maybe) was begging a man to give him
some money.....
The conversation went something like this..(originally it was in
hindi)
The child : Saheb!!!give me some money
please!!
The man : (kept mum)
The child : Saheb!! i haven't eaten
for two days!!please give me some money!!
The man : Are you hungry??
The child : yes
The man : Then let me buy you some
food rather than giving u the money....
The child : No saheb!!you just give me
the money...i will buy it myself!!
The man : no i cannot give u money but
i can buy you some food..
The child : no saheb!!i have brothers
and sisters who are hungry just as i am ... so how can i
eat??
The man : well where are your brothers
and sisters now??i will buy them some food too??
The child : they are not here....so
please can u give me some money??
The man : i won't..
The child just left the place....
It seems that the man did not beleive the child's story and thought
that he was collecting money for some other purpose and not for
food...looking at the child it didn't seem as if the child was
bluffing ..... however,i was left with the pondering
question....who was morally correct??
love arun
P.S->Saheb is a hindi word for "sir"